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Martin van Creveld was born in Rotterdam and emigrated from the Netherlands to Israel as a small child. Educated at Hebrew University in Jerusalem and at the London School of Economics, he is currently professor of history at Hebrew University. His numerous books prove that his interests go well beyond his own discipline of military history. He is well versed in anthropology, political philosophy and international relations (but less so in economics). In a world in which most academics are super specialists, Van Creveld’s interdisciplinary approach of history is invigorating.
In a number of books, for instance Nuclear proliferation and the future of conflict, published in 1993 (New York, Free Press) and The transformation of war (New York, Free Press, 1991) Van Creveld claims that nuclear proliferation has a stabilizing effect on international relations simply because government leaders everywhere understand the nature and implications of these destructive weapons and therefore refrain from using them. He even argues that the conduct of large-scale wars is no longer suited to achieve foreign policy objectives because of the fear of escalation to a full-scale nuclear war.
Van Creveld’s thesis is thought provoking but also questionable. His argument that nuclear weapons reduce the risk of large-scale (conventional) war is difficult to reconcile with the fact that there have been quite a number of wars from 1945 onwards. To make matters worse, there is simply no scientific method available that allows us to say that there is a causal link between stability in international relations and the existence of nuclear weapons. Circumstantial evidence may support Van Creveld’s theory but it may also support alternative explanations of the relative stability of the period 1945 until 1989 as for instance the reconnaissance revolution that enables both sides to evaluate each other’s capabilities to a degree that is totally unprecedented in the history of relations between great powers. Moreover, the potential destabilizing effects of, for instance, technical malfunctioning of rockets, terrorism and the temptation to deploy tactical (thus low impact) nuclear weapons are still on the table.
In his most recent book The rise and decline of states his old argument that technological military developments reduce the vitality of nation states is still there, albeit the time-span is now much more ambitious, beginning with pre-history and ending in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Van Creveld claims that states came into being between 1300 and 1700 and are declining since 1975. He uses a modified Weberian concept of the state in which sovereignty and territoriality play a fundamental role. According to him a state is a corporation and, therefore, separate from both its members and its rulers. As other corporations, a state is a legal persona of its own. It has rights and duties and engages in various activities as if it were a living individual. A state, however, differs from other corporations in three ways. First, a state authorizes them all but is itself authorized solely by others of its kind. Secondly, the attributions of sovereignty are reserved for it alone. Finally, it exercises these functions over a certain territory inside which its jurisdiction is both exclusive and all embracing.
Following this narrow definition, a state is a comparatively recent invention. During most of history, governments existed but not states. The state emerges only as late as the seventeenth century, and only in some countries. A secular Leviathan existing independently of the person or the will of the monarch, with effective control of domestic forces via a specialized bureaucracy, a military apparatus, tax structures and manifesting itself in an inter-state system among other legally sovereign and equal powers. Using this definition older European and non-European governments, as for instance the Roman or Chinese empires, are clearly not states. That is somewhat unfortunate since the Greek and Roman empires already began to make a distinction between kin and non-kin, egalitarian and hierarchical divisions of labour, and public and private realms, but many historians would support Van Creveld’s point of view. As will be shown below, however, his corporation perspective on the state becomes problematic when he applies it to the modern world and is almost forced to conclude that states are declining.
Van Creveld is on much safer ground when he argues in chapter 3 that the state, as it emerged between about 1560 and 1648, was conceived not yet as an end but solely as an instrument. Chapter 4 is titled ‘The state as an ideal: 1789 to 1945’ and represents the genesis of the state as an end in itself. The dichotomy state as an instrument and as an end is interesting though not an original one. In the Netherlands for instance, Kossmann has expressed a similar view. It must be said, however, that Van Creveld eloquently portrays the historical origins of the conception of a state as and end in itself.
According to him, the man who did more than anyone else to start the great transformation of a state as an instrument into an end and, later, a living God, was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In his Contrat Sociale (Social Contract) of 1762, he suggested that the community in which people are born had a corporate persona – a moi commun (a collective me), represented by the general will. Conversely, patriotism - the active submission to, and participation in, the general will – became the highest virtues of all and the source of all the remaining ones. Rousseau, however, was not a nationalist. To him the essence of the patrie (native country) were not some lofty ideals but the more humdrum aspects of life such as language, clothes, customs etc.
It was only in the years after 1789, when the marriage of nation and state was consummated. Napoleon’s victory over Prussia inspired Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche Nation (Addresses to the German Nation (1807-1808)) in which anti-French sentiment was almost transformed into a religious principle. At a more theoretical level Hegel attributed reason – and thus the shaping of history – neither to humanity as a whole nor to individuals but to states.
The state’s transformation of an instrument into an ideal could never have taken place if it had not also reinforced its grip on society far beyond anything attempted by its early modern predecessor. It needed the police and prison apparatus, the education system, and the welfare system to make sure that the daily grind would be under its control. These new activities required the state to acquire unprecedented financial means to back up its claims. Between 1870 and 1914 Central banks acquired the monopoly to print money and to control the currency and the money supply.
This new development did not come a moment too soon. When World War I broke out, government expenditure soared and citizens gave sometimes even their life, in defence of their nation. The state had indeed become an end in itself. All governments showed what they really thought of their own paper by taking it off gold, thus leaving their citizens empty-handed. During World War II, the pattern was repeated. Both Churchill and Roosevelt were well aware that the labours of the workers for the war effort had to be compensated after the war. Pointing to the enormous increase in production brought about by the military effort, it seemed logical to ask oneself the question whether it would be possible to keep only a small fraction of those resources in the hands of the state and use them for public purposes such as combating poverty and unemployment.
At its zenith, however, the state began to erode. In chapter 6, Van Creveld mentions four reasons why the state is in decline since 1975. First, as he has argued in earlier work, due to the introduction of nuclear weapons, the ability of states to go to war against each other has diminished since 1945. Since he claims that "states can only develop a strong appeal to emotions as they prepare for, and wage war" (p. 337), it follows that all the other functions states assumed are in trouble. Secondly, since 1975 the conviction has gained ground that the modern welfare state is no longer economically affordable or, as some claimed, socially desirable. Thirdly, technology, which between 1500 and 1945 has been such a great help in constructing the state, has turned around and is often causing states to lose power in favour of various kinds of organizations which are either not territorially based, or lacking sovereignty, or both. Finally, many states are becoming less willing and able to guarantee the life and property of their citizens, with the result that this task is being increasingly delegated to other organizations.
These arguments are not entirely convincing. As has been argued earlier on, Van Creveld’s assertion that nuclear arms reduce the number of military conflicts may be true but there is simply no scientific method to back up this claim. The subsequent claim that the vitality of a nation state depends on the possibility to wage war seems to be an overestimation of the military aspects of state and an underestimation of its economic aspects. Perhaps economic well being of its citizens is already a sufficient precondition for a vital nation even if citizens feel that the agents of the state had little to do with the economic growth.
His second claim that everywhere the modern welfare state is retreating is valid but it remains to be seen whether this process – up to now it has only been modestly applied in both France and Germany - will not come to a stand still. Besides, even a curtailed welfare state is still a giant apparatus in comparison with its nineteenth century forerunner or even its interwar predecessor.
His third claim that technology is often causing states to lose power to other organizations stems directly from his conception of the state as a corporation. Seen from this perspective, it is hardly surprising that he leaves much that is law making, coercive and even military in the hands of rival ‘corporations’. He claims that rival governments as the United Nations and the EC are strong and promising. The United Nations has more teeth than the League of Nations but Van Creveld neglects the intrinsic weakness of any collective security system in which governments cooperate on the basis of a curious mixture of idealism and self-interest. In the case of conflicting interests decisive action will only be taken if a powerful coalition of states is able to dictate policy. If this coalition does not exist, states either remain together on the basis of ambiguities leading to inertia or the dominant power ignores the Treaty. In the case of the EC, only time will tell if this economic giant will also get strong political feet. If taxation is anything to go by, and the history of the formation of states demonstrates how important it was, the EEC receives still only one percent of the value-added tax receipts of its member states plus the customs union revenues, agricultural levies and 1,27 % of the GNP of the member states. Considering that one percent of VAT amounts to more than half of the total EEC budget, it becomes clear how small the latter is compared to the budget of a large modern nation state. In the last decade of the twentieth century, for instance, the EC budget was never more than between 1 and 2 per cent of EC GNP. National budgets can be as much as 50 per cent of GNP.
Finally his last claim that states are not able anymore to guarantee the life and property of its citizens is correct but does not automatically imply that Leviathan is dying. It is true, the provision of security, which since Hobbes has been recognized as the most important function of the state, is greatly challenged by terrorists and other forms of organized violence. The growing tendency to hire private security guards may undermine the credibility of police forces. However, privatisation of security, provided that it works, however, does not automatically undermine the vitality of the state. Citizens may be willing to tolerate the nation-state as long as it does not intervene too much in their affairs and as long as other organizations execute the tasks that were originally done by the state. It seems that Van Creveld is much better in explaining the rise of the state than in predicting its decline.
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